Barcelona

COLUMN: Xavi Hernandez, Joan Laporta, and the Pressure of the Virtuous Cycle 

In 2003, a new FC Barcelona board led by a young quartet of executives – Joan Laporta, Sandro Rosell, Josep Maria Bartomeu, and Ferran Soriano – won a shocking victory in the club’s presidential election. They, alongside the new sporting director Txiki Bergiristain, etched their names into Barça’s history by successfully modernising a club that had become outdated and filled with cronyism after the long tenure of the Jose Luis Nunez – Joan Gaspart duo.  

This modernisation process, however, was fraught with risk. In a brilliant chronicle, journalist Thore Haugstad explains the major strategic dilemma the new board had to face. 

Soriano said they had two options: 

1) Evolution. Cut costs, accept a few years of austerity and ‘walking through the desert’. No titles. Slow recovery. 

2) Revolution. A joint effort to cut costs, restructure debt and invest in the team. 

They chose the second option. Soriano knew it was risky, but felt the desert walk would enable their rivals to pull away so far that Barça might become a ‘second-tier’ club, like Valencia or Atletico Madrid. In Madrid, Florentino Perez was already signing Galacticos, while Manchester United were bringing in twice the money that Barca were. To Soriano they only really had one option. They had to act fast, risks be damned. 

Soriano called this revolution option the virtuous cycle. Barca would invest money to build a team that could win titles, and that success would raise the money to invest further in the squad and repeat the cycle.  

That 2003 summer, the club would sign the iconic Ronaldinho as Laporta’s alleged deal with David Beckham collapsed. While the 2003-04 season started tumultuously, Barca overtook a free-falling Galacticos era of Real Madrid to finish second in the league and head into next season with more optimism.

In the summer of 2004, one of the most iconic transfer windows in Barca’s history occurred. Several big names (with big wages) were let go. Meanwhile, Barca signed several key players who, alongside Ronaldinho and Rafa Marquez signed the previous year, would become the foundation of their successful 2004-2007 cycle: Samuel Eto’o, Juliano Belletti, Edmilson, Sylvinho, Ludovic Giuly, Henrik Larsson, and Deco. This summer kickstarted the virtuous cycle and Barca’s golden age in the 2000s and 2010s. 

As Laporta returned to Barca and began his second presidential term in 2021, he believed he could re-ignite this virtuous cycle. Once again, the options were evolution or revolution, and Laporta chose the latter. Instead of tightening the belt and selling key players to fund a slow rebuild, Laporta’s new board pulled the notorious economic levers to kick start another spending spree. 

The context of 2021, however, was fairly different compared to 2003. Back then, Barcelona made half as much revenue as Manchester United. In the 2020-21 season, right before Laporta took over, Barcelona had one of the five highest revenues in world football, even during the middle of COVID years. 

It was impossible to double or triple the club’s revenue like Laporta’s first board did in the 2000s. In 2021, increasing Barça’s revenue even by a modest percentage would require even starker sacrifices: selling the exploitation rights to some of the club’s assets and turning future revenues into a massive cash injection for the present day.  

How Barca’s front office operated now also differed from that of Laporta’s first board. Laporta has always prioritised loyalty over merit in his front office, but this tendency has been dialed to the max during his second tenure. In 2003, competent executives like Bergiristain and Soriano had more leverage to steer the club in the direction they thought was best. Now, it’s Laporta’s way or the highway.  

As columnist Gemma Herrero reminds us, ever since Laporta took over in 2021, a total of 33 administrators and executives have either been fired or left the club. This list includes prominent names such as CEO Ferran Reverter, Markel Zubizarreta (the women’s football director), Jordi Llaurado (the man in charge of Espai Barca), and Director of Football Mateu Alemany.  

In Alemany’s stead, Deco rose to the role of sporting director. While we can’t question Deco’s knowledge of the football market, it is also true he had never held a role of this calibre within a football club. And perhaps most troublingly, his previous background as a player agent under Jorge Mendes’ wing raises questions about potential conflicts of interest.  

Whereas a more sober club like Liverpool would hire personnel and players by doing their due diligence, doing thorough interviews, and reviewing CVs, the current feeling is that Barca hires after a nice, expensive dinner chat with Laporta’s front office people. It is in this context that Xavi Hernandez assumed the coaching role at Can Barca. A club that, in a way, has now become a more cronyist organisation like the one Laporta toppled back in 2003. 

Despite these doubts, the 2022-23 season showed that Laporta’s vision could triumph again. Laporta’s board used the cash injection from the palancas to spend on several high-profile targets throughout 2022: Ferran Torres, Jules Kounde, Raphinha, and Robert Lewandowski. Xavi instilled a tremendous competitive spirit in this group and a tactical identity that shone more by the intense and organised pressure Barca applied against the ball than what they did in possession.  

And even then, Xavi managed to find a solution midway through the season that gave his team more control in possession by fielding the midfield quartet of Frenkie de Jong, Sergi Busquets, Gavi, and Pedri. Xavi might be rigid in some areas, but he still had enough flexibility to compromise his previous tactical structure to fit his four most impactful midfielders on the pitch. This turbo-charged Barca left a stumbling Real Madrid biting the dust to win the league title and the Spanish Supercopa resoundingly. 

As the club entered the summer of 2023 without the ability to pull more levers, Deco had to work with more constraints to build a top squad for Xavi. Several players were thus signed on free/affordable transfers or loans: Oriol Romeu, Ilkay Gundoğan, Inigo Martinez, Joao Cancelo, and Joao Felix. It was a transfer window that delivered great value for money, but the fit of some players in Xavi’s game plan was… questionable. 

After all, the main attribute of Xavi’s team last season was their intense pressing, and none of the players in that list stood out for their ability to run and cover ground. Perhaps Xavi and Barca’s bet was that these players would allow the team to improve in possession and run less, but that has not necessarily materialised on the pitch.  

And regardless of who came in the summer, the underlying expected goal numbers showed that Barca’s defensive excellence the previous season was likely unsustainable. It was a temporary state of flow and focus from the players but could not be maintained over several seasons.  

Considering this overperformance and the profile of the new signings, it’s not surprising that the team’s defence looked shakier this season. Gavi’s valiant efforts plugged in many gaps in the defensive structure, but after his injury, the entire defence imploded.  

This culminated in a spectacular January debacle where the team conceded 19 goals throughout the month. Barca were blown away by Real Madrid in the Supercopa final, knocked out of the Copa del Rey by Athletic, and conceded five goals against Villarreal this weekend. Now, the club’s only shot at winning silverware this year is the Champions League, and the odds do not look great given their previous history of European debacles over the last six years. 

If we zoom out, firing Xavi after his previous achievements sounds unwise. He has struggled to find solutions in an admittedly injury-ridden squad but has also demonstrated problem-solving capabilities in previous seasons. In a normal big club, Xavi’s titles last season should have given him enough credit in the bank.  

Yet that’s the other side of the coin of Laporta’s new attempt at a virtuous cycle: the financial risks are higher than before, and they put more pressure than ever to win titles. This pressure cooker finally consumed an exhausted Xavi last weekend after the Villarreal loss.  

Despite the incoherences and gaps in the squad, I cannot think of more than six squads in Europe (Manchester City, Liverpool, Real Madrid, Bayern, PSG, and Arsenal) that could be considered as or more talented than Barcelona’s. It certainly has the potential to play much better than what we have seen during the 2023-24 season. That is the big ask for the coach who takes the Barcelona hot seat next season.  

If the club chooses their next coach wisely, there’s still a chance they could keep the virtuous cycle going. However, the margin of error is much smaller than in 2003. And now that Xavi has announced his departure, future criticism will likely be redirected towards a Laporta who can no longer use Xavi as a shield. 

Even if the circumstances have changed and the situation has taken a turn for the worse, it’s hard to imagine Laporta backing down from his vision. Doubling down on his bet is, of course, a double-edged sword. Sure, he could successfully improvise another rabbit out of the hat, but if the trick fails, the blowback will be even harder, both politically for him and financially for Barcelona. 

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